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a b s t r a c t
Implicit moral evaluations—i.e., immediate, unintentional assessments of the wrongness of actions or
persons—play a central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life. Yet little research has
employed methods that rigorously measure individual differences in implicit moral evaluations. In five
experiments, we develop a new sequential priming measure—the Moral Categorization Task—and a
multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task into multiple component processes. These
include implicit moral evaluations of moral transgression primes (Unintentional Judgment), accurate
moral judgments about target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional tendency to judge actions
as morally wrong (Response Bias). Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but not
Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional Judgment was stronger toward moral transgres-
sion primes than non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2–4). Intentional Judgment was associated
with increased error-related negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral control
(Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger
Unintentional Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across Experiments 1–4, implicit
moral evaluations converged with moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong primes, but
not negative primes, was negatively associated with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated
with moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and practical applications of formal modeling for
moral psychology are discussed.
! 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Imagine that you open your morning newspaper and read that a
school of children overseas has been bombed as part of a terrorist
attack. Innocent children were killed, and it is likely that more will
die as a result of the attack. Before you have engaged in reflective
thought, you have an immediate flash of negative affect and a
moral intuition: this is wrong. If someone asked you to justify your
reaction, you might reason that the bombing violates the inherent
dignity of human life, or you might appeal to the consequences
that it has wrought. You also might wonder why you are even
being asked this question, and whether it reveals a disturbing lack
of morality that makes your conversation partner seem less trust-
worthy. Such implicit moral evaluations seem to be the beating
heart of human morality, and it is important to know who has
them and who does not.
In the current work, we use tools from cognitive science to
develop a new measure and formal model of implicit moral evalu-
ations. We define implicit moral evaluations as immediate, uninten-
tional assessments of the moral wrongness of actions or persons.
Prominent accounts of moral cognition verbally describe features
of implicit moral evaluations (e.g., Greene, 2008; Haidt, 2001),
but little research has formally specified their processing charac-
teristics. We stipulate that implicit moral evaluations are strongly
counter-intentional: not only can they arise spontaneously with-
out any intention (i.e., weak unintentionality), but they can also
influence moral judgments and behaviors in opposition to contrary
intentions (i.e., strong unintentionality; cf. Moors & De Houwer,
2006). In order to provide a test of whether implicit moral evalua-
tions are counter-intentional, we need to utilize measurement
techniques that are designed to capture unintentional influence,
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as well as formal models that disentangle unintentional influences
from other co-activated processes. Our research is the first to a
priori formalize implicit moral evaluations with this conceptual
precision and test whether they are strongly counter-intentional.
The present work advances the field of moral cognition by spec-
ifying the operating conditions of implicit moral evaluations.
Moreover, this work speaks to the relationship between moral cog-
nition and other, non-moral forms of evaluative processing. We
stipulate that implicit moral evaluations are not merely reducible
to affective evaluations. Instead, we suggest that implicit moral
evaluations require both core affect (i.e., valence and arousal)
and accessible conceptual knowledge about relevant moral rules
(Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015; Nichols, 2004). What makes
an implicit moral evaluation different from other implicit affective
evaluations is this conceptual content related to morality. That
said, we do not consider implicit moral evaluations to be a natural
kind, categorically distinct from non-moral evaluations (Cameron
et al., 2015). Instead, the difference is likely to be one of degree,
with many of the same domain-general processes, such as affect,
shared between moral and non-moral evaluations. This is also
important given that what is deemed to be morally relevant can
vary substantially across individuals (Graham et al., 2013), and
within the same individual across different situations (Van Bavel,
Xiao, Cunningham, 2012). Because moral relevance is idiographic
and dynamic, it is likely that processes comprising implicit moral
evaluations overlap substantially with non-moral cognition (see
also Decety & Cowell, 2014; Young & Dungan, 2012).
In the current paper, we suggest that implicit moral evaluations
are but one of many cognitive processes activated in response to
morally relevant situations. Just as people can engage in uninten-
tional moral evaluations, they can also intentionally morally eval-
uate the actions and characters of others. One theoretically novel
aspect of our approach is that we suggest that intentional and
unintentional forms of moral evaluation can operate simultane-
ously within the same moral context. Moreover, some people
may be habitual ‘‘moralizers”, biased to respond to most actions
and people as morally wrong regardless of the situation or moral
content involved. In order to dissociate implicit moral evaluations
from intentional moral evaluations and response biases, we draw
upon formal models. Although formal models are well used across
cognitive science (for reviews, see Batchelder & Riefer, 1999;
Erdfelder et al., 2009; Payne & Bishara, 2009; Riefer & Batchelder,
1988), they have been applied only sparingly in moral psychology
to understand component processes of moral cognition (Crockett,
2016). Modeling variation in implicit moral evaluations—in a way
that disentangles this latent process from others that may be acti-
vated in response to moral transgressions—can lead to more
refined theoretical predictions about who will engage in moral
behavior. The present research develops an implicit measure of
moral judgment called the Moral Categorization Task, and a formal
model for decomposing moral judgments on this task into their
underlying component processes.
1.1. Developing an implicit measure of moral judgment
Despite the prevalence of claims about automaticity within
moral psychology, little research has used tools from social cogni-
tion to model variability in implicit moral evaluations. Implicit
measures—such as the implicit association test (Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), affect misattribution procedure
(Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), and evaluative priming
task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986)—capture auto-
matically activated evaluations while bypassing self-report (for
review, see Wentura & Degner, 2010), and can predict explicit atti-
tudes and behaviors (Cameron, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Payne, 2012;
Greenwald, Uhlmann, Poehlman, & Banaji, 2009; Hofmann,
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). Although limited,
some work has attempted to use implicit measures to assess vari-
ation in implicit moral evaluations (e.g., implicit association test:
Aquino & Reed, 2002; Cima, Tonnaer, & Lobbestael, 2007; Gray,
MacCulloch, Smith, Morris, & Snowden, 2003; Luo et al., 2006;
Perugini & Leone, 2009; affect misattribution procedure: Graham
et al., 2016; Hofmann & Baumert, 2010).
Two concerns can be raised about prior uses of implicit mea-
sures of moral judgment. First, in the paradigms listed above, the
target judgment is not moral judgment: it is the speed of relative
associations (implicit association test) or the proportion of pleas-
ant/unpleasant judgments (affect misattribution procedure). One
goal of the current research is to develop an implicit measure that
directly requires making moral judgments. Second, prior uses of
implicit measures have taken a task dissociation approach, which
assumes that implicit measures only capture automatic processes
and explicit measures only capture controlled processes (cf.
Payne, 2008). However, neither implicit nor explicit evaluation
measures are ‘‘process-pure” (e.g., Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski,
Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Payne, 2001): performance on both
types of measures can result from automatic evaluations, executive
control, or both. We present an alternative, multinomial modeling
approach that does not make the task dissociation assumption, but
rather dissociates multiple processes contributing to performance
on the same task.
We developed a novel implicit measure of moral judgment: the
Moral Categorization Task. On each of a series of trials, participants
see two words in quick succession—a prime and a target—each of
which can depict actions that are typically considered morally
wrong (e.g., murder) or morally neutral (e.g., baking). Participants
are instructed to judge whether the target word names a kind of
act that is morally wrong or not, while avoiding the influence of
the prime word. To allow for multinomial modeling, the judgment
is binary (wrong vs. not wrong). Because the targets of judgment
are normatively wrong or neutral, accuracy can be computed. To
obtain sufficient errors for modeling, a response deadline is
imposed on target judgment (e.g., Degner, 2009). This task is mod-
eled on sequential priming tasks that have been used with process
modeling, such as the weapon identification task (Payne, 2001) and
affect misattribution procedure (Payne et al., 2005).
We constructed the Moral Categorization Task to capture
immediate responses to moral transgressions, through their influ-
ence on categorization of acts as morally wrong or not wrong. Such
reactions are among the most highly studied phenomena in moral
psychology (though not typically under time pressure; Monin,
Pizarro, & Beer, 2007), and are an important everyday feature of
moral cognition that likely invoke different processes than those
engaged by moral dilemma stimuli (e.g., reasoning to decide
between competing moral principles; Monin et al., 2007). Given
debate over the use of sacrificial dilemmas in moral psychology
(Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren,
2014; Greene, 2013; Kahane, 2015; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias,
& Savulescu, 2015; Gray & Schein, 2012), we believe that our
approach possesses a methodological advantage. Recent theory
and evidence suggests that moral judgment operates by categoriz-
ing whether a particular act (e.g., murder) is a member of the set of
acts that is immoral (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013; Schein & Gray,
2015). This approach converges with neuroscience studies of moral
evaluation: e.g., ‘‘everyday situations involving moral transgres-
sions are likely to be evaluated on the basis of matching personal
experiences and social knowledge stored in episodic and semantic
memory” (Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, & Filik, 2015, p. 1021). In
summary, the Moral Categorization Task is designed to capture a
within-subjects priming effect on moral judgment, which can be
formally modeled as resulting from individual differences in impli-
cit moral evaluations, among other processes.
C.D. Cameron et al. / Cognition 158 (2017) 224–241 225
1.2. Developing a formalized process model of moral judgment
Multinomial processing tree models formalize the latent cogni-
tive processes that cause performance on a task (Batchelder &
Riefer, 1999; Riefer & Batchelder, 1988; Sherman, Klauer, & Allen,
2011), with some of the most prominent examples in psychology
including process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2001, 2008;
Payne & Cameron, 2014) and the Quadruple process model
(Conrey et al., 2005). These models stipulate a priori how compo-
nent processes interact to drive task performance, such that task
performance can be used to estimate the probabilities of each pro-
cess operating (Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014). Overall, the
multinomial model is similar to a ‘‘Control-dominating” process
dissociation model with a guessing parameter (Payne & Bishara,
2009). We selected this kind of model because of its wide use in
social psychology and its ability to account for data on sequential
priming tasks similar to the Moral Categorization Task (Bishara &
Payne, 2009).
For the Moral Categorization Task, we stipulate three processes
that drive judgment: Intentional Judgment (I), Unintentional Judg-
ment (U), and Response Bias (B). Intentional Judgment is the ability
to follow task instructions and intentionally evaluate whether tar-
get actions are morally wrong, operating with probability I. A per-
son with high Intentional Judgment can follow task instructions
and make accurate moral judgments about target actions. Inten-
tional Judgment is similar to the Control parameter in process dis-
sociation models.
Unintentional Judgment is the tendency to judge the morality of
target actions in a prime-consistent manner, operating when
Intentional Judgment fails with conditional probability
ð1" IÞ $ U. A person with high Unintentional Judgment will have
stronger implicit moral evaluations of prime actions. Once acti-
vated by prime actions, these should carry over and influence
moral judgments about target actions. Unintentional Judgment is
prime-consistent, with prime content reflecting two ends of a sin-
gle continuum from typically wrong to typically not wrong: if the
prime is a transgression then Unintentional Judgment should bias
target judgments toward ‘‘wrong”, and if the prime is a neutral
action then Unintentional Judgment should bias target judgments
toward ‘‘not wrong.” In other words, Unintentional Judgment is
not always defaulted to evaluate prime actions as wrong, but
instead captures variation in the moral content of prime stimuli;
as noted below, we estimate the tendency to always judge actions
as wrong as a separate parameter (Response Bias). Unintentional
Judgment is similar to the Automatic parameter in process dissoci-
ation models. We stipulate that Intentional and Unintentional
Judgment differ on one feature—intentionality—because partici-
pants’ task intentions are set to evaluate target actions while
avoiding influence of prime actions. Prime influence directly coun-
ters task intentions, and so qualifies as strongly counter-intentional
(Moors & De Houwer, 2006).
When both Intentional Judgment and Unintentional Judgment
fail, Response Bias is the directional tendency to judge target actions
as always wrong with conditional probability ð1" IÞ $ ð1" UÞ $ B
or always not wrong with ð1" IÞ $ ð1" UÞ $ ð1" BÞ. When unable
to judge the target action accurately, and in the absence of an impli-
cit moral evaluation, a person might have a directional tendency to
always judge target actions as morally wrong. By including
Response Bias, we disentangle implicit moral evaluations from
indiscriminate tendencies to moralize anything regardless of
content.
Parameters are estimated from observed frequencies of
responses in each condition of the task, using the equations in
the process tree depicted in Fig. 1 and Appendix A. Each tree
branch depicts the combination of processes stipulated to cause
accurate or inaccurate responses on each trial type, such that accu-
racy on each trial type is the sum of probabilities across branches
of the tree. For instance, on Wrong-Neutral trials, accurate
responses occur when Intentional Judgment operates and
Response Bias tends toward ‘‘not wrong” when Intentional Judg-
ment and Unintentional Judgment fail, represented as the joint
set of probabilities: Iþ ð1" IÞ $ ð1" UÞ $ ð1" BÞ. An inaccurate
response occurs when Intentional Judgment fails and there is
prime-consistent Unintentional Judgment, and Response Bias
tends toward ‘‘wrong” when Intentional Judgment and Uninten-
tional Judgment fail, represented as the joint set of probabilities:
ð1" IÞ $ Uþ ð1" IÞ $ ð1" UÞ $ B. Parameter values are estimated
through maximum likelihood estimation, iteratively changing val-
ues until optimal fit is reached between observed and model-
predicted frequencies. Model fit is assessed with a likelihood-
ratio G2 statistic, with a non-significant result indicating model
fit, and with the effect size w, with values less than 0.05 indicating
acceptable fit (cf. Clerkin, Fisher, Sherman, & Teachman, 2014).
Testing specific hypotheses about parameters requires con-
straining them and comparing model fit against the baseline
model. Effect sizes are derived for these comparisons using effect
size w, with higher w values indicating greater influence of the
manipulation on the parameter. If constraining any parameter to
zero significantly reduces model fit, then it can be said to influence
task performance. If constraining any parameter across conditions
reduces model fit, then the manipulation influences the parameter
in question. To examine individual differences, the model is esti-
mated for each participant to derive individual-level parameter
estimates, which are then correlated with individual scores on per-
sonality traits of interest.
1.3. Convergence with moral personality
If the current approach is capturing implicit moral evaluations,
then Unintentional Judgment should converge with moral person-
ality traits. We included four measures of moral personality across
Experiments 1–4: psychopathic tendencies, moral identity, guilt
proneness, and sacred value judgments. We mention these in the
Method of each experiment, but examine relationships with
parameter estimates in a later section (Section 7).
People with psychopathic tendencies are important for models
of moral cognition because they can express normatively correct
moral judgments despite acting immorally (Kiehl, 2008). Although
psychopathic tendencies are not usually linked to changes in expli-
cit moral judgment, they are linked to different patterns of brain
activation (Aharoni, Antonenko, & Kiehl, 2011; Harenski,
Harenski, Shane, & Kiehl, 2010; Marsh & Cardinale, 2012, 2014;
for review, see Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Psycho-
pathic individuals have reduced associations between harmful
actions and negative affect (Blair, 2007; Gray et al., 2003), and
exhibit callous affect in response to the suffering of others (Kiehl,
2008), which may in turn produce weaker implicit moral evalua-
tions of moral transgressions.
Moral identity is the degree to which morality is important to a
person’s self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Internalized moral
identity involves intrinsic importance to the self-concept, whereas
symbolic moral identity involves extrinsic (i.e., reputational)
importance. Internalized moral identity has been more consis-
tently linked with moral behaviors (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed &
Aquino, 2003). According to the social cognitive model of moral
identity (Aquino, Reed, Freeman, Lim, & Felps, 2009), having stron-
ger internalized moral identity makes information about morality
more readily accessible, which may in turn produce stronger impli-
cit moral evaluations of moral transgressions.
Guilt and shame proneness reflect the degree to which people
experience guilt and shame about committing moral transgres-
sions. Moral emotions are thought to inhibit commission of moral
226 C.D. Cameron et al. / Cognition 158 (2017) 224–241
transgressions (Bandura, 1999), and guilt proneness has been
linked to moral behavior (Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2012; Cohen,
Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011). People high in guilt proneness have
stronger aversion to transgressions—because they are more sensi-
tive to their interpersonal costs—which may produce stronger
implicit moral evaluations of transgressions. By contrast to guilt,
shame is less consistently related to moral behavior (Cohen et al.,
2011), and so we did not have a strong prediction that shame
proneness would associate with implicit moral evaluations.
Finally, we included a measure of sacred value judgments, as
the degree to which people would be willing to commit moral vio-
lations for money. To the degree that people perceive particular
principles as sacred, they have stronger aversion to acts that vio-
late those principles (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Tetlock,
Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), which should in turn produce
stronger implicit moral evaluations of moral transgressions.
2. Experiment 1: Establishing the paradigm
In Experiment 1, we had three aims. First, we wanted to validate
that we could capture a within-subjects priming effect in the Moral
Categorization Task. Second, we used the multinomial model to
disentangle influences of Intentional Judgment, Unintentional
Judgment, and Response Bias. Third, we examined how a process-
ing manipulation would influence these parameters. We predicted
that imposing a fast response deadline would reduce Intentional
Judgment, but not Unintentional Judgment or Response Bias.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
We recruited 65 undergraduate students (43 female, 19 male, 3
unreported) for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned
to the 400-ms (N = 23), 500-ms (N = 20), or 800-ms (N = 22) dead-
line conditions. We used an outlier removal criterion for any par-
ticipants whose overall error rates on the task were greater than
3 standard deviations above the sample mean, and only needed
to implement this criterion in Experiment 5.
2.1.2. Materials and procedures
After being seated at individual computer workstations, partic-
ipants completed the Moral Categorization Task. Participants were
told:
Each trial of this task will start with a fixation cross, +, that you
should keep your eyes on. Then we will show you pairs of words
flashed one after the other. Ignore the yellow words, which
come first. Blue words will come second. Your job is to make
a quick judgment of whether the blue words represent an action
that is morally wrong. If the blue word represents an action that
is morally wrong, press the M key on the keyboard. If the blue
word does not represent an action that is morally wrong, press
the Z key. Ignore the influence of the yellow words that come
beforehand. Finally, please respond as fast as possible.
Word colors were chosen to be similar on brightness and were
not counterbalanced; we have no a priori reason to believe that
counterbalancing would significantly impact results. Each trial
began with a fixation cross displayed in the center of the screen
for 200 ms. The cross was followed by a prime word presented
for 100 ms, followed by a blank screen for 75 ms, and then a target
word which remained on screen until participants responded. The
response deadline was constrained to 400, 500, or 800 ms depend-
ing on condition. We chose two fast deadlines because, as this was
the first time we had used a deadline in this task, we did not know
what speed would be sufficiently fast to cause a high error rate but
still allow respondents to perform the task. If participants
exceeded the response deadline, they saw a large red ‘‘X” and were
instructed to ‘‘Please respond faster!” Participants completed 3
blocks of 40 trials each. Within each block, there were 10 trials
per prime-target combination (Wrong-Wrong, Wrong-Neutral,
Multinomial Processing Tree Model for the Moral Categorization Task
Fig. 1. Multinomial processing tree model for the moral categorization task. Note. The processing tree illustrates the formalized model of underlying component processes
that lead to either accurate (+) or inaccurate (") moral judgments of target actions on the Moral Categorization Task, for each of the four prime-target combinations
(‘‘W” = Wrong, ‘‘N” = Neutral). Each path name (‘‘I”, ‘‘U”, ‘‘B”) is the probability of that process operating. The tree depicts four possible paths: (a) Intentional Judgment—
represented as I—drives the response, leading to accuracy on all trial types; (b) Unintentional Judgment, the tendency to morally judge target actions in a prime-consistent
manner, drives response when Intentional Judgment fails, with probability ð1" IÞ $ U; (c) Response Bias to judge target actions as ‘‘wrong” when Intentional and
Unintentional Judgment fail, with probability ð1" IÞ $ ð1" UÞ $ B; and (d) Response Bias to judge target actions as ‘‘not wrong” when Intentional and Unintentional
Judgment fail, with probability ð1" IÞ $ ð1" UÞoð1-BÞ.
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Neutral-Wrong, Neutral-Neutral), which were presented ran-
domly. Prime and target words were selected to represent actions
that are usually considered morally wrong or morally neutral, with
neutral actions chosen to be lower on valence and arousal based on
the Affective Norms for English Words Database (Bradley & Lang,
1999).
We focused on actions that involve harm to others, given that
such concerns are deemed important to morality across popula-
tions (Graham et al., 2013; Gray, Schein, &Ward, 2014). There were
two lists of morally wrong words (words that name kinds of acts
that are morally wrong) and two lists of morally neutral words
(words that name kinds of acts that are morally neutral). Word lists
were counterbalanced so that one list of morally wrong words was
used for prime words and the other list was used for target words,
and similarly for the neutral word lists. Morally wrong items
included: murder, rape, racism, assault, lying, stealing, torture,
betrayal, abuse, cheating, slaughter, genocide, terrorism, massacre,
theft, cruelty, deception, molesting, killing, and robbery. Morally neu-
tral items included: writing, farming, painting, baking, poetry, won-
dering, golf, leisure, modesty, agreement, travel, whistling, industry,
reunion, nursing, listening, passage, watching, tennis, and exercise.
2.1.2.1. Individual difference measures. Participants completed the
Self-Reported Psychopathy Scale (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick,
1999), the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino &
Reed, 2002), the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen et al.,
2011), and the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (Graham
et al., 2009).
2.1.2.2. Exploratory measures and demographics. We also included
the following exploratory measures: the Penn Inventory of Scrupu-
losity (Abramowitz, Huppert, Cohen, Tolin, & Cahill, 2002), Empa-
thy Quotient Short-Form (Wakabayashi et al., 2006), and the
Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale (Olatunji, Cisler, Deacon,
Connolly, & Lohr, 2007). Participants reported their gender, ethnic-
ity, age, and political orientation (from 1 = Extremely liberal to
7 = Extremely conservative).
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Error rates
Responses were coded for accuracy, and all responses were used
in analysis regardless of whether they exceeded response deadli-
nes in order to maximize data used. We included the deadline to
increase overall response speed; because the error rates are inter-
preted as means across conditions, missing a deadline on a partic-
ular trial does not invalidate that trial, as long as the deadline is
effective in keeping the average speed within the desired range.
As predicted, a 3(Deadline: 400, 500, 800 ms) $ 2(Prime:
wrong, neutral) $ 2(Target: wrong, neutral) mixed ANOVA
revealed a Prime $ Target interaction, F(1,62) = 75.86, p < 0.001,
gp2 = 0.55, such that participants made more errors judging neutral
targets after wrong vs. neutral primes, and more errors judging
wrong targets after neutral vs. wrong primes. Table 1 displays error
rates by prime, target, and deadline condition. There was a
Prime $ Target $ Deadline interaction, F(2,62) = 4.01, p = 0.023,
gp2 = 0.12, such that the Prime $ Target interaction was stronger
under the 400-ms deadline, F(1,22) = 30.41, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.58,
and 500-ms deadline, F(1,19) = 33.22, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.64, than
under the 800-ms deadline, F(1,21) = 16.51, p = 0.001, gp2 = 0.44.
As expected, increasing time to respond reduced the impact of
primes on responses.
2.2.2. Multinomial model
We conducted modeling analyses using MultiTree (Moshagen,
2010). From the behavioral data, observed frequencies of accurate
and inaccurate responses were computed for each cell of the
priming task and entered as data into MultiTree. The model was
stipulated by writing equations that specify which response
(accurate, inaccurate) on a given trial type (i.e., Wrong-Wrong,
Wrong-Neutral, Neutral-Wrong, Neutral-Neutral) results from
each path through the processing tree. The overall probability of
a given response on a given trial type is then computed as the
sum of each of these paths (displayed in Appendix A). Using
maximum likelihood estimation, MultiTree iteratively changes
parameter estimates to achieve optimal fit between observed and
model-expected frequencies. Thus, the parameter estimates are
logically defined in accordance with the model, and estimated
relative to the behavioral data, such that the overall model fit
and parameter estimates can be evaluated. For all experiments,
we used random starting values for parameters and 5000 iterations
(Moshagen, 2010). In this model fitting approach, a p-value greater
than 0.05 indicates acceptable model fit, that the model can
account for the observed behavioral frequencies. Establishing
model fit is important in these analyses, because it validates that
the underlying process model accounts for task performance.
Failure to find model fit implies that the process model does not
accurately account for task performance, and that alternative pro-
cess model specifications may be preferable.
For each deadline condition, we estimated one parameter each
for Intentional Judgment, Unintentional Judgment, and Response
Bias. For all experiments, we estimated Unintentional Judgment
Table 1
Mean proportion of errors by prime, target, and deadline, Experiment 1.
Target 400 ms deadline condition 500 ms deadline condition 800 ms deadline condition
Wrong prime Neutral prime g Wrong prime Neutral prime g Wrong prime Neutral prime g
Wrong 0.22 (0.16) 0.34 (0.15) "0.71** 0.21 (0.14) 0.29 (0.14) "0.54** 0.08 (0.11) 0.12 (0.14) "0.31*
Neutral 0.47 (0.20) 0.34 (0.24) 0.54** 0.43 (0.24) 0.32 (0.19) 0.49** 0.17 (0.14) 0.10 (0.12) 0.45**
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Effect sizes are Hedges’ gav for simple effect comparisons between prime types within a target category. *p < 0.050, **p < 0.010.
Table 2
Parameter estimates, Experiment 1.
Parameter 400 ms deadline condition 500 ms deadline condition 800 ms deadline condition Across conditions
Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] DG2(2) w
Intentional 0.32 [0.28, 0.35] 0.38 [0.34, 0.42] 0.76 [0.74, 0.79] 443.96** 0.48
Unintentional 0.35 [0.26, 0.44] 0.31 [0.21, 0.42] 0.38 [0.23, 0.54] 0.64 0.02
Resp. Bias 0.51 [0.47, 0.54] 0.53 [0.48, 0.57] 0.46 [0.38, 0.53] 2.48 0.04
Note. yp < 0.100, *p < 0.050, **p < 0.010.
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for wrong-prime trials while constraining Unintentional Judgment
for neutral-prime trials to zero. An alternative modeling option
would be to constrain Unintentional Judgment after wrong-prime
and neutral-prime trials to be equal. We used the first approach
for two reasons. First, variation in implicit moral evaluations about
transgression primes was of primary theoretical interest. Second,
in later experiments we aimed to compare Unintentional Judgment
after wrong vs. negative primes, and so constraining across prime
categories would be infeasible. Another alternative modeling
option would be to estimate Unintentional Judgment as the ten-
dency to rate target actions as morally wrong when any moral
transgression as present—either as prime or target. Although such
a model might be seen as capturing reactivity to moral stimuli, it
does not capture the definition of implicit moral evaluations. We
are specifically interested in how participants implicitly evaluate
the moral content of primes, through their systematic and
counter-intentional influence on target judgments. By contrast,
moral content of target actions is defined as relevant input for tar-
get judgments, and its influence would not be counter to task
intentions. Thus, modeling implicit moral evaluation as a tendency
to rate any target as immoral when any transgression is present (as
prime or target) does not fit the conceptual definition of implicit
moral evaluations.
The model fit the data well, G2(3) = 1.52, p = 0.677, w = 0.03.
Table 2 displays parameter estimates by deadline condition. As
predicted, imposing fast deadlines decreased Intentional Judg-
ment, DG2(2) = 443.96, p < 0.00001, w = 0.48, but did not influence
Unintentional Judgment, DG2(2) = 0.64, p = 0.725, w = 0.02, or
Response Bias, DG2(2) = 2.48, p = 0.289, w = 0.04.
2.3. Discussion
Using a novel implicit measure, Experiment 1 revealed that par-
ticipants displayed consistent biases in their moral judgments:
when primed with words denoting morally wrong actions such
as murder, they were more likely to mistakenly judge morally neu-
tral target actions as wrong. To understand this systematic pattern
of mistakes, we applied a multinomial model to understand pro-
cesses underpinning moral judgments. Performance depended on
how accurately participants could morally judge target actions
(Intentional Judgment), implicit moral evaluations of prime actions
(Unintentional Judgment), and a directional tendency to judge
target actions as wrong (Response Bias). Imposing fast response
deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but not Unintentional
Judgment or Response Bias, suggesting that Intentional Judgment
has operating conditions typically ascribed to controlled
processing.
3. Experiment 2: The role of negative affect
In Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate Experiment 1 while
addressing an alternative explanation of task performance.
Because the prior experiment did not include non-moral negative
content, it is possible that the morally wrong primes influenced
moral judgment due to negative affect, and not due to the moral
content of the primes themselves. Although negative affect is likely
to be a component of implicit moral evaluations, conceptual con-
tent about morality should play an additional role (Cameron
et al., 2015; Nichols, 2004). We added non-moral negative stimuli
that were matched on valence and arousal. If the Moral Categoriza-
tion Task is about morality, rather than negative affect alone, then
transgression primes should influence moral judgment above and
beyond non-moral negative primes.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
We recruited 100 undergraduates (68 female, 32 male) for
course credit.
3.1.2. Materials and procedures
3.1.2.1. Moral categorization task. Participants completed the same
task as in Study 1. The task consisted of two blocks of 180 trials
each. Within each block, there were 20 trials per prime by target
combination. Response deadline was held constant at 500 ms.
Morally wrong items were: murder, rape, abuse, theft, killing,
assault, torture, betrayal, slaughter, and terrorism. Morally neutral
items were: writing, golf, baking, agreement, leisure, painting, tennis,
farming, modesty, and exercise. Non-moral negative items were:
cancer, disaster, trauma, distress, pain, rabies, accident, nightmare,
bankruptcy, and rejection. Morally wrong and non-moral negative
items were chosen to be matched on valence (MMoral = 1.86,
SDMoral = 0.23; MNegative = 1.73, SDNegative = 0.27; on 9-point scale
with 1 representing most negative valence and 9 representing
most positive valence) and arousal (MMoral = 6.45, SDMoral = 0.42,
MNegative = 7.05, SDNegative = 0.52; on 9-point scale with 1 represent-
ing lowest arousal and 9 representing highest arousal) based upon
the Affective Norms for English Words database (Bradley & Lang,
1999).
3.1.2.2. Individual difference measures. Participants completed the
four moral personality measures: the Self-Reported Psychopathy
Scale, the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale, the Guilt and
Shame Proneness Scale, and the Moral Foundations Sacredness
Scale.
3.1.2.3. Exploratory measures and demographics. Participants also
completed 10 sacrificial dilemmas (the congruent and incongruent
versions of the abortion, baby, car, torture, and vaccine dilemmas
from Conway & Gawronski, 2013). For each stimulus used in the
Moral Categorization Task, participants rated negative valence,
positive valence, arousal, and moral wrongness. Lastly, participants
rated a series of controversial moral issues, such as abortion and
euthanasia, on negative and positive valence, arousal, and moral
conviction. The sacrificial dilemmas and stimulus evaluation mea-
sures were exploratory and will not be discussed further. Finally,
participants reported gender, ethnicity, age, religiosity, political
orientation, and socioeconomic status using the MacArthur ladder
(Adler & Ostrove, 1999).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Error rates
For negative target trials, we coded responses as inaccurate if
participants judged targets as wrong. As predicted, a 3(Prime:
wrong, negative, neutral) $ 3(Target: wrong, negative, neutral)
within-subjects ANOVA revealed a Prime $ Target interaction, F
(4,396) = 22.08, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.18. Table 3 displays error rates
by prime and target condition. To understand this interaction, we
examined the influence of prime type on judgment accuracy for
each target type.
Prime type influenced judgments of neutral targets, F(2,198)
= 28.40, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.22, with greater errors after wrong vs.
neutral primes, negative vs. neutral primes, and wrong vs. negative
primes. Prime type influenced judgment of wrong targets, F
(2,198) = 10.57, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.10, with greater errors after neu-
tral vs. wrong primes and neutral vs. negative primes. Lastly, prime
type influenced judgment of negative targets, F(2,198) = 18.23,
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p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.16, with greater errors after wrong vs. neutral
primes and negative vs. neutral primes.
3.2.2. Multinomial model
As documented in Appendix A, parameters for negative-prime
trials were computed identically to the parameters for wrong-
prime trials. Prime-consistent responses to negative primes were
expected to bias judgments of target actions toward ‘‘wrong”, as
with wrong primes. Thus, a comparison between Unintentional
Judgment parameters for wrong-prime and negative-prime trials
captures the difference across these prime conditions in the ten-
dency to judge target actions as ‘‘wrong”. Implicit moral evalua-
tions should be stronger toward transgression primes (e.g.,
murder) than toward negative non-moral primes (e.g., cancer).
We estimated one Intentional Judgment parameter, two Unin-
tentional Judgment parameters (for wrong and negative primes),
and one Response Bias parameter. This initial model did not fit,
G2(5) = 810.76, p < 0.00001, w = 0.45. We noted that error rates
on negative-target trials were substantially higher than on other
trials. Participants may have had difficulty separating negative
affective responses to targets from the focal task of morally judging
targets, thus not performing as instructed and leading to higher
errors. Because participants responded very differently on these
target trials than on other target trials, we excluded these, leading
to adequate fit, G2(2) = 2.43, p = 0.297, w = 0.02. Table 4 displays
parameter estimates. As predicted, Unintentional Judgment was
stronger toward wrong primes than negative primes, DG2(1)
= 12.62, p = 0.0004, w = 0.06, indicating that participants had a
stronger tendency to judge target actions as wrong after being
primed with moral transgressions. Were the effect due merely to
incongruence created by negative affect, such specificity would
not be observed.
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 2 built upon prior findings in multiple ways. First,
the priming effect for morally wrong and neutral primes and tar-
gets directly replicated prior findings. Second, the addition of
non-moral negative primes revealed that the original priming
effect is not reducible to negative affect. Although negative affec-
tive primes such as cancer influenced performance on the priming
task, this effect was weaker. Modeling revealed that Unintentional
Judgment was stronger after wrong primes than negative primes,
suggesting that implicit moral evaluations are stronger when they
involve both negative affect and conceptual knowledge about
morality.
4. Experiment 3: Idiographic moral judgments
Another alternative explanation is that the task is not capturing
participants’ personally endorsed implicit evaluations, but rather
stereotypes about which actions society deems acceptable or unac-
ceptable. To account for this possibility, in Experiment 3 we
instructed participants to self-generate moral transgressions that
they had strong personal opposition to. We expected that
participant-generated moral transgressions would operate simi-
larly to the researcher-generated moral transgressions used in pre-
vious experiments. Such results would generalize our approach to
idiographic moral evaluations, which are of growing interest in
moral psychology (Gray & Keeney, 2015; Meindl & Graham,
2014; Skitka, 2010).
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
We recruited 58 undergraduates (38 female, 19 male, 1 unre-
ported) for course credit.
4.1.2. Materials and procedures
4.1.2.1. Moral categorization task. At the beginning of the task, par-
ticipants were instructed:
Before getting started, please enter in an action or issue that
YOU personally believe is morally wrong. This should be an
action or issue that violates your core moral beliefs, values,
and convictions. In order to provide valid data, please type in
1 or 2 words to describe this action or issue, and make sure it
is in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS.
After typing in a response, participants were instructed:
Next, please enter in a DIFFERENT action or issue that YOU per-
sonally believe is morally wrong. This should be an action or
issue that violates your core moral beliefs, values, and convic-
tions. In order to provide valid data, please type in 1 or 2 words
to describe this action or issue, and make sure it is in ALL CAPI-
TAL LETTERS.
The first idiographicmoral issuewas always used as the prime on
idiographic-prime trials and the second idiographicmoral issuewas
always used as the target on idiographic-target trials, such that the
Table 4
Parameter estimates, Experiment 2.
Parameter Wrong prime Negative prime Neutral prime Across conditions
Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] DG2(1) w
Intentional 0.38 [0.37, 0.39] 0.38 [0.37, 0.39] 0.38 [0.37, 0.39] – –
Unintentional 0.21 [0.17, 0.26] 0.12 [0.08, 0.17] 0.00 (constant) 12.62** 0.06
Resp. Bias 0.55 [0.53, 0.57] 0.55 [0.53, 0.57] 0.55 [0.53, 0.57] – –
Note. Intentional Judgment and Response Bias parameters constrained to be equal across prime conditions, and Unintentional Judgment constrained to zero in the Neutral
prime condition. yp < 0.100, *p < 0.050, **p < 0.010.
Table 3
Mean proportion of errors by prime and target, Experiment 2.
Target Wrong prime Negative prime Neutral prime gWrongNegative gWrongNeutral gNegativeNeutral
Wrong 0.22 (0.17) 0.24 (0.17) 0.27 (0.16) "0.12 "0.30** "0.18*
Negative 0.58 (0.28) 0.56 (0.29) 0.52 (0.29) 0.05 0.19** 0.14**
Neutral 0.41 (0.25) 0.37 (0.25) 0.33 (0.24) 0.12** 0.29** 0.17**
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Effect sizes are Hedges’ gav for simple effect comparisons between prime types within a target category. yp < 0.100, *p < 0.050,
**p < 0.010.
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same idiographic stimulus was presented repeatedly. Because of
this, the idiographic stimuli (one for prime, one for target) were
repeated more frequently than the other stimulus categories. Many
of the idiographic issues generated by participants were similar to
the non-controversial moral stimuli, with the most common items
being murder (n = 18), rape (n = 15), cheating (n = 10), and lying
(n = 10). Participants completed 2 blocks of 320 trials each, with
40 trials per prime-target combination. The other word lists and
response deadline were identical to Experiment 2.
4.1.2.2. Individual difference measures. Participants completed the
four moral personality measures: the Self-Reported Psychopathy
Scale, the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale, the Guilt and
Shame Proneness Scale, and the Moral Foundations Sacredness
Scale.
4.1.2.3. Exploratory measures and demographics. Participants com-
pleted exploratory measures of social distancing (Skitka, Bauman,
& Sargis, 2005) and valence, arousal, and wrongness ratings for
each stimulus in the Moral Categorization Task. Finally, partici-
pants reported gender, ethnicity, age, religiosity, political orienta-
tion, and subjective socioeconomic status.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Error rates
Four participants did not provide priming data. We also
excluded data for five participants who failed to follow instructions
in generating their two idiographic transgression stimuli (for
instance, by entering a non-word or entering the same stimulus
twice, by reporting an act with a moral judgment, e.g., ‘‘STEALING
IS WRONG”, or an act with a justification for a judgment, e.g.,
‘‘RAPE-VIOLATES CONSENT”); re-including these participants did
not change results from what is reported below. As predicted, a 4
(Prime: wrong, idiographic, negative, neutral) $ 4(Target: wrong,
idiographic, negative, neutral) within-subjects ANOVA revealed a
Prime $ Target interaction, F(9,432) = 11.10, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.19.
Table 5 displays error rates by prime and target. To understand this
interaction, we examined the influence of prime type on judgment
for each type of target.
Prime type influenced judgment of neutral targets, F(3,144)
= 14.96, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.24, such that participants made more
errors after wrong vs. neutral primes, idiographic vs. neutral
primes, and negative vs. neutral primes, and marginally more
errors after wrong vs. negative primes. Prime type influenced judg-
ment of wrong targets, F(3,144) = 5.16, p = 0.002, gp2 = 0.10, with
more errors after neutral vs. idiographic primes. Prime type influ-
enced judgments about idiographic targets, F(3,144) = 10.17,
p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.18, with more errors after neutral vs. wrong
primes, neutral vs. idiographic primes, and neutral vs. negative
primes. Lastly, prime type influenced judgments of negative tar-
gets, F(3,144) = 5.47, p = 0.001, gp2 = 0.10, with more errors after
idiographic vs. neutral primes, and marginally more errors after
negative vs. neutral primes.
The goal in this experiment was to test whether participant-
generated idiographic stimuli were treated similarly to researcher-
generated wrong stimuli. We compared whether wrong and idio-
graphic primes were similarly distinct from neutral primes, and
whether wrong and idiographic primeswere similarly distinct from
negative primes, separately for each type of target (wrong, idio-
graphic, negative, neutral). To thedegree thatwrong and idiographic
primes exert comparable influence relative to these contrast prime
categories (negative, neutral), they can be inferred to be similar. As
seen in Table 5, wrong and idiographic primes each elicited fewer
errors than neutral primes, similarly on both wrong-target and
idiographic-target trials. On neutral-target trials, wrong and idio-
graphic primes both elicited more errors than neutral primes.
Wrong and idiographic primes did not elicit different amounts of
errors compared to negative primes, similarly on both wrong-
target and idiographic-target trials. In all but one instance the
descriptive directions of the wrong and idiographic prime vs. nega-
tive prime comparisons were negative (i.e., wrong and idiographic
primes eliciting fewer errors than negative primes); furthermore,
we hesitate to interpret any changing signs of these comparisons
given that they were non-significant. In summary, when examining
the relevant comparisons across prime categories (wrong and idio-
graphicvs. neutral,wrongand idiographic vs. negative), themajority
of these comparisons exhibit a similar direction to each other, sug-
gesting that wrong and idiographic prime and target stimuli are
being treated similarly by participants.
4.2.2. Multinomial model
For modeling analyses, we excluded negative-target trials as in
Experiment 2. We estimated a baseline model with one Intentional
Judgment parameter, three Unintentional Judgment parameters
(after wrong, idiographic, and negative primes, with Unintentional
Table 5
Mean proportion of errors by prime and target, Experiment 3.
Target Wrong prime Idio. prime Negative prime Neutral Prime gWrong Idio gWrong Neg gWrong Neut gIdio Neg gIdio Neut gNeg Neut
Wrong 0.19 (0.17) 0.17 (0.17) 0.19 (0.17) 0.23 (0.16) 0.11 0.02 "0.21 "0.09 "0.33** "0.23
Idio. 0.15 (0.16) 0.15 (0.17) 0.17 (0.17) 0.21 (0.14) "0.05 "0.11 "0.40** "0.06 "0.32** "0.27*
Neg. 0.64 (0.26) 0.66 (0.25) 0.64 (0.26) 0.59 (0.26) "0.08 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.25* 0.17y
Neut. 0.49 (0.23) 0.49 (0.22) 0.45 (0.24) 0.39 (0.25) 0.01 0.15y 0.39** 0.14 0.39** 0.25*
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Effect sizes are Hedges’ gav for simple effect comparisons between prime types within a target category. yp < 0.100, *p < 0.050,
**p < 0.010.
Table 6
Parameter estimates, Experiment 3.
Parameter Wrong prime Idiographic prime Negative prime Neutral prime Across conditions
Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] DG2(2) w
Intentional 0.35 [0.34, 0.36] 0.35 [0.34, 0.36] 0.35 [0.34, 0.36] 0.35 [0.34, 0.36] – –
Unintentional 0.27 [0.21, 0.33] 0.28 [0.22, 0.34] 0.20 [0.14, 0.27] 0.00 (constant) 6.18* 0.06
R. Bias-WN 0.63 [0.61, 0.65] 0.63 [0.61, 0.65] 0.63 [0.61, 0.65] 0.63 [0.61, 0.65] – –
R. Bias-Idio 0.68 [0.66, 0.70] 0.68 [0.66, 0.70] 0.68 [0.66, 0.70] 0.68 [0.66, 0.70] – –
Note. Intentional Judgment and the two Response Bias parameters (R. Bias-WN is for wrong-target and neutral-target trials, R. Bias-Idio is for idiographic-target trials)
constrained to be equal across prime conditions, and Unintentional Judgment constrained to zero in the Neutral prime condition. yp < 0.100, **p < 0.010, *p < 0.050.
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Judgment after neutral primes set to zero), and two Response Bias
parameters. We estimated a unique Response Bias parameter for
idiographic-target trials because this target stimulus was pre-
sented more frequently and thus may have elicited a stronger bias
to judge target actions as wrong compared to other target types.
This model fit the data adequately, G2(6) = 11.65, p = 0.070,
w = 0.08. Table 6 displays parameter estimates by prime condition.
As expected, prime condition influenced Unintentional Judgment,
DG2(2) = 6.18, p = 0.045, w = 0.06. Unintentional Judgment did
not differ after wrong primes and idiographic primes, DG2(1)
= 0.17, p = 0.684, w = 0.01, but was marginally weaker after nega-
tive primes than wrong primes, DG2(1) = 3.70, p = 0.054, w = 0.04,
and was weaker after negative primes than idiographic primes,
DG2(1) = 5.41, p = 0.020, w = 0.05. As expected, Response Bias was
stronger for idiographic targets than for wrong and neutral targets,
DG2(1) = 18.00, p < 0.0001, w = 0.10.
4.3. Discussion
Experiment 3 revealed that participant-generated moral trans-
gressions operated similarly to the researcher-generated moral
transgressions used in previous experiments, influencing judgment
accuracy of neutral targets in a comparable manner. This result
suggests that the current approach can be used to assess idio-
graphic moral evaluations.
5. Experiment 4: Neurophysiology of moral judgment
In Experiment 4, we used event-related potentials to validate
processing characteristics of Intentional Judgment. Event-related
potentials allow temporally precise measurement of neural activ-
ity during stimulus presentation and behavioral response
(Amodio, Bartholow, & Ito, 2014). We focused on the error-
related negativity (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993),
a negative deflection on the electroencephalogram (EEG) that
occurs within 100 ms of committing an error on a task, and that
is thought to be produced by the anterior cingulate cortex
(Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994). The error-related negativity is
typically thought to indicate discrepancy between expected (cor-
rect) and actual (incorrect) outcomes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), or
conflict monitoring more generally (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen,
2004). The ERNmay also reflect affective responses to errors (Cava-
naugh & Shackman, in press; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Luu,
Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003), and be a ‘‘distress sig-
nal” when performance does not meet expectations (Bartholow
et al., 2005, p. 41; Proudfit, Inzlicht, & Mennin, 2013). In the Moral
Categorization Task, we expected that Intentional Judgment would
associate most strongly with error-related negativity on incongru-
ent trials, particularly those that require an incompatible moral
response to be inhibited (i.e., Wrong-Neutral trials).
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
We recruited 58 college undergraduates from a large, urban
Canadian campus (38 female, 20 male) for course credit.
5.1.2. Materials and procedures
5.1.2.1. Individual difference measures. In an online session prior to
the experiment, participants completed three moral personality
measures: the Self-Reported Psychopathy Scale, the Self-
Importance of Moral Identity Scale, and the Guilt and Shame
Proneness Scale.
5.1.2.2. Exploratory measures and demographics. In the online ses-
sion, participants also completed the following exploratory mea-
sures: the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry,
1988), Mach-IV inventory of Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis,
1970), Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale (FAD-Plus; Paulhus
& Carey, 2011), and Internal Control Index (Duttweiler, 1984).
Finally, participants reported gender, ethnicity, age, current and
childhood household income, subjective socioeconomic status,
English as first language, and handedness.
5.1.2.3. Moral categorization task. Participants completed 3 blocks
of 100 trials each. Within each block, there were 20 trials each
for the 2(Prime: Wrong, Neutral) $ 2(Target: Wrong, Neutral)
design, as well as a set of 20 Negative-Neutral trials. To reduce task
duration, we did not include a Negative-Wrong cell. Word lists and
timing were identical to Experiment 2, and response deadline was
held constant at 450 ms.
5.1.2.4. Neurophysiological recording and processing. EEG activity
during the Moral Categorization Task was recorded using a stretch
Lycra cap (Electro-Cap International, Eaton, OH) embedded with 32
tin electrodes. Recordings were taken using a midline recording
montage, with concentration on the Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, and Oz
electrodes while using the mastoid M1 and M2 as reference elec-
trodes and the vertical oculogram VEOG+ and VEOG" to help filter
for eyeblinks. Recordings were digitized at 512 Hz using ASALab4
acquisition software (Advanced Neuro Technology B.V., Enschede,
The Netherlands) with an average-electrode reference and fore-
head ground. EEG data was analyzed using Brain Vision Analyzer
2.0 (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany). EEG data was re-
referenced to the average of the two mastoid channels (M1 and
M2), corrected for vertical-oculogram artifacts (Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1983), and digitally filtered offline between 0.1 and
30 Hz (24 dB IIR filter). An automatic procedure provided in Brain
Vision Analyzer was used to reject the artifacts. The criteria applied
were a voltage step of no more than 18 lV between sample points,
a voltage difference of 150 lV within 150 ms intervals, voltages
above 85 lV and below "85 lV, and a maximum voltage differ-
ence of less than 1.00 lV within 100 ms intervals. These intervals
were rejected from individual channels in each trial. ERP epochs
were time-locked to responses and created by examining continu-
ous EEG from 200 ms pre-response and 800 ms post response, with
"200 ms to 0 ms used for baseline correction. ERP averages were
created separately for each prime-target condition (i.e., Wrong-
Neutral, Wrong-Wrong, Neutral-Neutral, Neutral-Wrong,
Negative-Neutral). Data for these conditions were averaged within
participants independently for correct (correct-related negativity)
and incorrect responses (error-related negativity), and then
grand-averaged within the respective conditions. These were
Table 7
Mean proportion of errors by prime and target, Experiment 4.
Target Wrong prime Negative prime Neutral prime gWrongNeg gWrongNeut gNegNeut
Wrong 0.30 (0.18) – 0.39 (0.19) – "0.45** –
Neutral 0.33 (0.17) 0.29 (0.15) 0.24 (0.16) 0.24* 0.51** 0.30**
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Effect sizes are Hedges’ gav for simple effect comparisons between prime types within a target category. yp < 0.100, *p < 0.050,
**p < 0.010.
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defined at frontocentral sites (Fz, FCz, Cz), examining the mean
amplitudes within a 0–100 ms time window.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Error rates
This analysis focused on the 2 $ 2 of wrong and neutral primes
and targets, and did not incorporate Negative-Neutral trials.
Because we did not include Negative-Wrong target trials, the
design was unbalanced and so we excluded this set of trials. As
predicted, a 2(Prime: wrong, neutral) $ 2(Target: wrong, neutral)
within-subjects ANOVA revealed a Prime $ Target interaction, F
(1,57) = 35.63, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.39, such that participants made
more errors judging neutral targets after wrong vs. neutral primes,
and more errors judging wrong targets after neutral vs. wrong
primes. Table 7 displays error rates by prime and target condition.
5.2.2. Multinomial model
In this experiment, we estimated four parameters: one Inten-
tional Judgment parameter, two Unintentional Judgment parame-
ters (for wrong primes and negative primes, with Unintentional
Judgment toward neutral primes set to zero), and one Response Bias
parameter. This model fit the data well, G2(1) = 0.04, p = 0.840,
w = 0.00. Table 8 displays parameter estimates. Replicating previous
experiments, Unintentional Judgment was stronger after wrong
primes than negative primes, DG2(1) = 14.15, p = 0.0002, w = 0.06.
5.2.3. Error-related negativity
Because there were 5 within-subjects conditions of the task, we
needed a sufficient number of error trials in each condition. Given
past work indicating that the reliability of error-related negativity
values stabilizes after people commit about five errors (Olvet &
Hajcak, 2009), we needed to exclude 14 participants who made
too few errors (<5) on at least 1 of the 5 trial types. Difference
waves were computed by subtracting the correct-related negativ-
ity from the error-related negativity, which controls for processes
common to neural activation during accurate and inaccurate judg-
ments (Luck, 2005).
5.2.4. Error-related negativity by electrode site and condition
First, we submitted difference waves to a 3(Electrode site: Fz,
FCz, Cz) $ 2(Prime: wrong, neutral) $ 2(Target: wrong, neutral)
repeated measures ANOVA. Fig. 2 displays error-related negativity
difference wave amplitudes (0–150 ms post-response), derived
from the difference between incorrect and correct trials at the
FCz (Panel A) and Cz (Panel B) electrode sites, separately for each
prime-target combination. There was a main effect of electrode
site, F(2,86) = 12.58, p < 0.001, gp2 = 0.23. Error-related negativity
was weaker on the Fz electrode site compared to the FCz site,
p < 0.001, and the Cz site, p = 0.008, and did not differ on the latter
two sites, p = 0.998. Given that past studies focus on the FCz fron-
tocentral site (e.g., Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008;
Amodio et al., 2004; Inzlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012; Legault, Al-
Khindi, & Inzlicht, 2012), we averaged across FCz and Cz sites
and focused on these for further analyses. Additionally, main
effects and higher-order interactions for prime and target type
on error-related negativity were non-significant, ps > 0.600. Thus,
the error-related negativity did not differ across trial types in the
Moral Categorization Task, suggesting similar error-and perfor-
mance monitoring across trial types.
Table 8
Parameter estimates, Experiment 4.
Parameter Wrong prime Negative prime Neutral prime Across conditions
Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] DG2(1) w
Intentional 0.37 [0.36, 0.39] 0.37 [0.36, 0.39] 0.37 [0.36, 0.39] – –
Unintentional 0.22 [0.19, 0.26] 0.12 [0.07, 0.17] 0.00 (constant) 14.15** 0.06
Resp. Bias 0.38 [0.37, 0.40] 0.38 [0.37, 0.40] 0.38 [0.37, 0.40] – –
Note. Intentional Judgment and Response Bias parameters constrained to be equal across prime conditions, and Unintentional Judgment constrained to zero in the Neutral
prime condition. yp < 0.100, *p < 0.050, **p < 0.010.
Error-related Negativity Difference Waves for FCz and Cz Electrode Sites, Experiment 4
(A) (B)
Fig. 2. Error-related negativity difference wave amplitudes (0–150 ms post-response), derived from the difference between incorrect and correct trials at the FCz (Panel A)
and Cz (Panel B) electrode sites, Experiment 4. Difference waves are depicted for each prime-target combination (Wrong-Wrong, Wrong-Neutral, Neutral-Wrong, Neutral-
Neutral, Negative-Neutral).
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5.2.5. Error-related negativity and the multinomial model
Next, we examined the relationships between the error-related
negativity and individual-level parameter estimates. First, we
examined the relationship between error-related negativity on
Wrong-Neutral trials with Intentional Judgment, while controlling
for the error-related negativity on Wrong-Wrong trials. As
expected, higher error-related negativity on Wrong-Neutral trials
was associated with increased Intentional Judgment, b = 0.49, t
(41) = 3.85, p < 0.001. To isolate prime variance, we predicted
Intentional Judgment simultaneously from error-related negativity
on Wrong-Neutral, Negative-Neutral, and Neutral-Neutral trials
(cf. Amodio et al., 2004). Intentional Judgment was marginally
associated with higher error-related negativity on Wrong-Neutral
trials, b = 0.35, t(40) = 2.02, p = 0.051, but not Negative-Neutral tri-
als, b = 0.28, t(40) = 1.67, p = 0.103, or Neutral-Neutral trials,
b = 0.12, t(40) = 0.71, p = 0.485. The relationship between ERN
and Intentional Judgment was strongest on incongruent trials, par-
ticularly trials in which incompatible moral responses needed to be
inhibited (i.e., on Wrong-Neutral trials).
5.3. Discussion
Experiment 4 revealed that during the Moral Categorization
Task, Intentional Judgment corresponded to error-related negativ-
ity, a neurophysiological indicator of cognitive control. This finding
replicates prior work using event-related potential methodology
with sequential priming and process dissociation (Amodio et al.,
2004, 2008), and provides independent validation that the Inten-
tional Judgment parameter has characteristics of controlled
processing.
6. Experiment 5: Association with voting behavior
In the preceding experiments, we validated the Moral Catego-
rization Task and corresponding multinomial model, finding that
Intentional Judgment was sensitive to time pressure whereas
Unintentional Judgment was not reducible to negative affect. In
the final experiment, we aimed to establish the predictive validity
of Unintentional Judgment, by examining its relationship with
behavior in a field setting. We examined whether Unintentional
Judgment about gay marriage would associate with real-world
behavior: voting for or against Amendment One, a North Carolina
constitutional amendment to legally define marriage as between
one man and one woman. In the time leading up to the vote on
May 8, 2012, debate about this amendment was heavily moralized.
We conducted a field study of voters on the day of the referendum
to test whether Unintentional Judgment of gay marriage as morally
wrong would align with voting behavior. We adapted the task to
include gay marriage stimuli as primes and targets alongside the
normatively wrong and neutral stimuli. By examining judgment
accuracy and parameter estimates separately for Amendment
One supporters and opponents, we expected to validate implicit
moral evaluations about a debated moral issue on the basis of
known groups. Critically, we are not suggesting that voting in a
particular direction indicates moral competence. Instead, we are
suggesting that to the degree that some voters implicitly evaluate
gay marriage as morally wrong, they will be more likely to vote in
favor of an amendment that opposes gay marriage.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
We recruited 65 participants (41 female, 24 male,Mage = 47.12 -
years, SDage = 13.82 years) in Orange County, North Carolina.
Experimenters approached voters after they had exited polling sta-
tions and asked if they would like to participate in a study on ‘‘vot-
ing and attitudes.” Participants were compensated $5. We
excluded data for 1 participant who reported a vision condition
that made it difficult to see the screen, and 1 participant whose
overall error rate was more than 3 standard deviations above the
sample mean.
6.1.2. Materials and procedures
6.1.2.1. Voting. After being seated with laptops, participants read:
‘‘On today’s ballot, you were asked to vote either for or against
Amendment One. Amendment One is the Constitutional amend-
ment to provide that marriage between one man and one woman
is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid or recognized in
the state of North Carolina. Did you vote for or against Amendment
One? Please answer as honestly as possible.” Participants reported
whether they had voted for, voted against, or abstained from vot-
ing on Amendment One.
6.1.2.2. Moral categorization task. The task consisted of 3 blocks of
45 trials each. Within each block, there were 5 trials per prime-
target combination. Response deadline was held constant at
600 ms. The morally wrong items included: murder, rape, domestic
assault, lying, stealing, genocide, molesting, domestic abuse, cheating,
and robbery. The morally neutral items included: writing, golf, bak-
ing, agreement, leisure, painting, tennis, farming, modesty, and exer-
cise. The gay marriage word lists only had one item each: gay
marriage, same-sex marriage. We used reduced word lists for this
condition because few synonyms would be possible to use without
sacrificing intended meaning or brevity. Gay marriage stimuli were
used as both primes and targets.
6.1.2.3. Explicit moral judgment. After finishing the task, partici-
pants were asked ‘‘To what degree is gay marriage morally
wrong?” (from 1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely).
6.1.2.4. Demographics. Participants reported gender, age, ethnicity,
political orientation separately for social and economic issues,
political party affiliation, religiosity, religious affiliation, and
whether the reason they were voting was because of Amendment
One.
6.2. Results
6.2.1. Voting, political orientation, and explicit moral judgment of gay
marriage
Within our sample, 34 participants voted against and 29 partic-
ipants voted for Amendment One. Social and economic conser-
vatism were very highly correlated, r(63) = 0.91, and were
averaged together into an overall conservatism estimate, revealing
a balanced political sample (M = 3.69, SD = 1.93). In terms of party
affiliation, 26 participants self-identified as Democrats, 20 as
Republicans, and 17 as Independents. Moral wrongness judgments
of gay marriage (M = 2.76, SD = 1.80) followed a bimodal distribu-
tion. Nearly half of the sample (46.0%) judged that gay marriage
was not at all wrong; the second largest percentage of the sample
judged that gay marriage was extremely wrong (31.7%). Conser-
vatism was associated with stronger explicit wrongness judgments
about gay marriage, r(63) = 0.63, p < 0.001, and voting in favor of
Amendment One, B = 0.95, S.E. = 0.22, Wald = 18.15, p < 0.001.
Explicit wrongness judgments about gay marriage were associated
with voting in favor of Amendment One, B = 1.65, S.E. = 0.36,
Wald = 21.70, p < 0.001.
6.2.2. Error rates
Error rates were very low (M = 0.04, SD = 0.05), likely due to the
fact that from behavioral observation, many participants exceeded
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the response deadline. Low error rates can make modeling more
difficult, and should thus license caution in interpreting results.
We opted to examine the model here given the practical impor-
tance and unique nature of the field study. First, we conducted a
3(Prime: wrong, gay marriage, neutral) $ 2(Target: wrong, neu-
tral) $ 2(Vote: for Amendment One, against Amendment One)
mixed ANOVA. This analysis allowed us to examine whether gay
marriage primes were exerting similar influence as moral trans-
gression primes, and whether this differed based on voting deci-
sion. Table 9 displays error rates by prime and Amendment One
vote.
There was a Prime $ Vote interaction, F(2,122) = 3.14, p = 0.047,
gp2 = 0.05, but this was not qualified by a Prime $ Target $ Vote
interaction, F(2,122) = 0.79, p = 0.456, gp2 = 0.01. To better under-
stand the Prime $ Vote interaction, we estimated the influence of
prime on judgment for Amendment One supporters and oppo-
nents. For ease of description, we present separate analyses for
each target type (wrong, neutral), although these patterns are
not different from one another given the lack of 3-way interaction.
For wrong targets, there was not a Prime $ Vote interaction, F
(2,122) = 0.40, p = 0.673, gp2 = 0.01, such that prime type did not
influence judgment of wrong targets for Amendment One support-
ers, F(2,56) = 1.43, p = 0.249, gp2 = 0.05, or opponents, F(2,66)
= 0.01, p = 0.989, gp2 = 0.00. For neutral targets, there was a Pri-
me $ Vote interaction, F(2,122) = 3.22, p = 0.043, gp2 = 0.05, such
that prime type influenced judgment of neutral targets for Amend-
ment One supporters, F(2,56) = 3.80, p = 0.028, gp2 = 0.12, but not
opponents, F(2,66) = 0.11, p = 0.899, gp2 = 0.00. Critically, Amend-
ment One supporters made more errors judging neutral targets
after gay marriage primes compared to neutral primes. Amend-
ment One supporters showed a non-significant trend to make more
errors judging neutral targets after wrong primes than neutral
primes, and no difference in errors after wrong and gay marriage
primes. In summary, among participants who voted for Amend-
ment One, gay marriage primes acted similarly to morally wrong
primes, causing reduced accuracy in moral judgments about neu-
tral targets. However, given the low amount of errors and small
sample of the field study, we suggest that these effects should be
interpreted cautiously, as preliminary evidence.
6.2.3. Multinomial model
For the modeling analysis, we divided the sample into Amend-
ment One opponents (who support gay marriage) and Amendment
One supporters (who oppose gay marriage). We focused our mod-
eling analysis on the contrast of key interest: the influence of prime
type (wrong, gay marriage, neutral) on judgments of neutral tar-
gets. We had sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate five param-
eters with six cells of data. For each voter group, we estimated two
Unintentional Judgment parameters (one each for wrong-prime
and gay-marriage prime trials, with neutral-prime trials set to
zero). Because we did not expect Intentional Judgment to differ
across groups, we estimated one Intentional Judgment parameter
constrained to be the same across voter groups. A single Response
Bias parameter was constrained to chance (0.50) and held constant
across voter groups, as we did not expect this to vary across condi-
tions and we did not have additional degrees of freedom to esti-
mate this parameter.
This model fit the data, G2(1) = 1.92, p = 0.166,w = 0.05. Table 10
displays parameter estimates by prime condition and voting deci-
sion. Among Amendment One opponents, Unintentional Judgment
did not differ from zero for wrong primes, DG2(1) = 0.05, p = 0.820,
w = 0.01, or gay marriage primes,DG2(1) = 0.16, p = 0.692,w = 0.01,
and these did not differ from each other, DG2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.884,
w = 0.00. By contrast, among Amendment One supporters, Unin-
tentional Judgment differed from zero for wrong primes, DG2(1)
= 6.77, p = 0.009, w = 0.08, and gay marriage primes, DG2(1)
= 5.93, p = 0.015, w = 0.08, and these did not differ from each other,
DG2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.899, w = 0.00. Finally, Unintentional Judgment
about gay marriage was marginally stronger among Amendment
One supporters than Amendment One opponents, DG2(1) = 2.93,
p = 0.087, w = 0.06, indicating that participants who voted against
gay marriage had stronger implicit moral evaluations of gay mar-
riage as morally wrong.
6.3. Discussion
In Experiment 5, we replicated the priming effect on the Moral
Categorization Task with the specific issue of gay marriage and
showed how it differed as a function of voting: among people
who voted for Amendment One, seeing gay marriage as a prime
made them more likely to mistakenly judge neutral target actions
as morally wrong. Multinomial modeling revealed that compared
to Amendment One opponents (who support gay marriage),
Amendment One supporters (who oppose gay marriage) displayed
marginally stronger Unintentional Judgment toward gay marriage
primes. People who voted to abolish gay marriage had stronger
implicit moral evaluations that gay marriage was morally wrong.
This result indicates that the parameter estimates has predictive
validity, connecting implicit moral evaluations to social behavior.
The low error rates in this study make formal modeling more dif-
ficult, and license caution in interpretations of modeling results.
Thus, we suggest the current finding is preliminary, and that it
should inspire comprehensive tests of the predictive validity of
these process parameters.
7. Individual differences analyses
In the final set of analyses, we examined associations between
individual-level parameter estimates and four moral personality
measures: psychopathic tendencies, moral identity, guilt prone-
ness, and sacred value judgments. We predicted that Unintentional
Judgment about moral transgressions would correlate negatively
with psychopathic tendencies, and positively with moral identity,
guilt proneness, and sacred value judgments.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
The total number of participants in Experiments 1–4 with com-
plete data for individual-level parameter estimates and moral per-
Table 9
Mean proportion of errors by prime, target, and amendment one vote, Experiment 5.
Target Voted for amendment one Voted against amendment one
Wrong prime Gay marriage prime Neutral prime gWN gGN Wrong prime Gay marriage prime Neutral prime gWN gGN
Wrong 0.03 (0.05) 0.02 (0.06) 0.01 (0.02) 0.42 0.28 0.07 (0.10) 0.06 (0.10) 0.06 (0.09) 0.02 0.00
Neutral 0.08 (0.13) 0.08 (0.11) 0.03 (0.06) 0.41 0.44* 0.05 (0.07) 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.11) 0.06 0.04
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Effect sizes are Hedges’ gav for simple effect comparisons between prime types within a target category. yp < 0.100, **p < 0.010,
*p < 0.050.
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sonality measures was N = 245. For Experiment 1, we used partic-
ipants in the 400-ms and 500-ms deadline conditions. We
excluded 9 participants whose individual models did not converge,
and 1 participant whose parameter estimates were unstable due to
a negative variance, leaving a final sample of 235 participants.1 A
priori power analysis revealed that to find an individual difference
correlation of r = 0.20 with 80% power and a two-tailed a probability
of 0.05, the required sample size was N = 193. Thus, collapsing across
Experiments 1–4 provided sufficient power to detect modest corre-
lations of parameter estimates with moral personality traits.
7.1.2. Materials and Procedures
7.1.2.1. Psychopathic tendencies. Participants completed Levenson’s
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick,
1995). This 26-item scale captures psychopathic traits including
callous affect, lack of empathy and guilt, manipulation, impulsivity,
and antisocial lifestyle and behaviors (e.g., ‘‘For me, what’s right is
what I can get away with”).
7.1.2.2. Moral identity. Participants completed the 10-item Self-
Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Partici-
pants were told to think of someone who embodied nine morally
praiseworthy characteristics: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly,
generous, hardworking, helpful, honest, and kind. Internalization
items asked participants to report how much these moral traits
were important to the self-concept (e.g., ‘‘I strongly desire to have
these characteristics”), whereas the symbolization items asked
participants to report how much they display these moral traits
in social settings (e.g., ‘‘I am actively involved in activities that
communicate to others that I have these characteristics”).
7.1.2.3. Guilt proneness. Participants completed the Guilt and
Shame Proneness Scale (GASP; Cohen et al., 2011). In this 16-
item measure, participants anticipate emotional responses to
moral transgressions (e.g., ‘‘After realizing you have received too
much change at a store, you decide to keep it because the sales-
clerk doesn’t notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel
uncomfortable about keeping the money?”) The four sub-scales
include Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation, or guilt at one’s own
actions; Guilt-Repair, or guilt-based actions to repair relationships
following transgressions; Shame-Negative-Self-Evaluation, or
shame about oneself; and Shame-Withdraw, or shame-based
actions to withdraw from public.
7.1.2.4. Sacred value judgments. Participants completed the 20-item
Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (Graham et al., 2009), which
assesses willingness to violate moral standards for money. Partici-
pants are instructed: ‘‘Try to imagine actually doing the following
things, and indicate how much money someone would have to pay
you, (anonymously and secretly) to be willing to do each thing. For
each action, assume that nothing bad would happen to you after-
wards. Also assume that you cannot use the money to make up
for your action.” The scale contains four items for each of the five
foundations posited by Moral Foundations Theory: harm (e.g.,
‘‘kick a dog in the head, hard”), fairness (e.g., ‘‘cheat in a game of
cards played for money with some people you don’t know well”),
in-group loyalty (e.g., ‘‘leave the social group, club, or team that
you most value”), authority, (e.g., ‘‘make a disrespectful gesture
at your boss, teacher, or professor”) and purity (e.g., ‘‘get a blood
transfusion of 1 pint of disease-free, compatible blood from a con-
victed child molester”). Response options are: $0 (I’d do it for free),
$10, $100, $1000, $10,000, $100,000, a million dollars, and never
for any amount of money.
7.2. Results
Table 11 displays correlations between parameter estimates
and moral personality variables. Unintentional Judgment toward
wrong primes correlated negatively with psychopathic tendencies
(a = 0.82), r(235) = "0.20, p = 0.002—with similar associations for
primary psychopathy, r(235) = "0.17, p = 0.011, and secondary
psychopathy, r(235) = "0.19, p = 0.004—and positively with inter-
nalized moral identity (a = 0.81), r(235) = 0.24, p < 0.001, symbolic
moral identity (a = 0.77), r(235) = 0.13, p = 0.049, GASP Guilt
Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (a = 0.62), r(235) = 0.17, p = 0.009,
and GASP Shame Negative-Self-Evaluation, (a = 0.61), r(235) = 0.17,
p = 0.011, but not GASP Guilt-Repair (a = 0.66), r(235) = 0.10,
1 In the individual difference analyses, there were also 21 participants whose
individual-level models failed to have adequate fit. When excluding these partici-
pants, results were relatively unchanged. Unintentional Judgment about transgres-
sions correlated negatively with psychopathic tendencies (r = "0.21, p = 0.002);
positively with internalized moral identity (r = 0.25, p < 0.001), GASP Guilt-Negative-
Behavior-Evaluation (r = 0.17, p = 0.014), GASP Shame-Negative-Self-Evaluation
(r = 0.18, p = 0.007); marginally positively with symbolic moral identity (r = 0.12,
p = 0.079) and GASP Guilt-Repair (r = 0.12, p = 0.071); and not with sacred values
(r = 0.11, p = 0.156), or GASP Shame-Withdrawal (r = "0.01, p = 0.905). Regression
analyses produced similar results. For psychopathic tendencies, there was a unique
negative relationship with Unintentional Judgment after transgression primes
(b = "0.16, t = "2.35, p = 0.020), which held when controlling for Unintentional
Judgment after negative primes (b = "0.19, t = "2.19, p = 0.030). For internalized
moral identity, there were positive relationships with Unintentional Judgment after
transgression primes (b = 0.17, t = 2.50, p = 0.013) and Intentional Judgment (b = 0.16,
t = 1.95, p = 0.053), which held when controlling for Unintentional Judgment after
negative primes (Unintentional Wrong: b = 0.19, t = 2.21, p = 0.028; Intentional:
b = 0.22, t = 2.42, p = 0.017). For GASP Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation, there was
a unique positive relationship with Unintentional Judgment after transgression
primes (b = 0.14, t = 1.93, p = 0.055), which held when controlling for Unintentional
Judgment after negative primes (b = 0.20, t = 2.27, p = 0.024). Finally, there were no
relationships of process parameters with sacred value judgments (ps > 0.140).
Because results were unchanged when excluding these participants, we retained
the fuller sample to maximize data used.
Table 10
Parameter estimates by amendment one vote, Experiment 5.
Parameter Wrong prime Gay marriage prime Neutral prime Across conditions
Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] Estimate [95% CI] DG2(1) w
Voted against
Intentional 0.91 [0.88, 0.94] 0.91 [0.88, 0.94] 0.91 [0.88, 0.94] – –
Unintentional 0.06 ["0.46, 0.58] 0.10 ["0.43, 0.64] 0.00 (constant) 0.02 0.00
Response bias 0.50 (constant) 0.50 (constant) 0.50 (constant) – –
Voted for
Intentional 0.91 [0.88, 0.94] 0.91 [0.88, 0.94] 0.91 [0.88, 0.94] – –
Unintentional 0.76 ["0.01, 1.53] 0.71 ["0.05, 1.46] 0.00 (constant) 0.02 0.00
Response bias 0.50 (constant) 0.50 (constant) 0.50 (constant) – –
Unintentional by voter group (DG2, w) 3.93*, 0.06 2.93y, 0.06
Note. Intentional Judgment constrained to be the same across voter groups, Response Bias estimated as a constant (0.50) across voter groups, and Unintentional Judgment
constrained to zero in the Neutral prime condition. **p < 0.010, yp < 0.100, * p < 0.050.
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p = 0.125, or GASP Shame-Withdraw (a = 0.77), r(235) = "0.01,
p = 0.896, and marginally positively with sacred value judgments
(a = 0.89), r(177) = 0.15, p = 0.053. By contrast, Unintentional
Judgment toward negative primes did not correlate with any moral
personality measures (ps > 0.090), with only a marginal correla-
tion with GASP Shame Negative-Self-Evaluation, r(196) = 0.12,
p = 0.096.
Intentional Judgment correlated positively with internalized
moral identity, r(235) = 0.21, p = 0.001, and GASP Guilt Negative-
Behavior-Evaluation, r(235) = 0.14, p = 0.032, marginally positively
with GASP Shame Negative-Self-Evaluation, r(235) = 0.13,
p = 0.056, and marginally negatively with psychopathic tendencies,
r(235) = "0.11, p = 0.089, but did not correlate with symbolic
moral identity, r(235) = 0.03, p = 0.649, GASP Guilt-Repair, r(235)
= 0.07, p = 0.308, GASP Shame-Withdrawal, r(235) = 0.00,
p = 0.997, or sacred values, r(177) = 0.04, p = 0.610. Response Bias
did not correlate with any moral personality measures (ps > 0.220).
To examine the specificity of these relationships to Uninten-
tional Judgment toward wrong primes and account for method
variance across studies, we conducted a series of multiple regres-
sions predicting each moral personality variable from Uninten-
tional Judgment toward wrong primes, Intentional Judgment, and
Response Bias. In these analyses, we included three contrast-
coded variables to account for method variance across the four
experiments. Because Unintentional Judgment toward negative
primes was only assessed in Experiments 2–4, we first present
regression analyses excluding this variable to allow for maximal
sample size, and subsequently add this variable in a separate
regression. This second analysis has a reduced sample size and only
includes two contrast-coded variables across three studies.
First, psychopathic tendencies were associated with reduced
Unintentional Judgment toward wrong primes, b = "0.18,
t = "2.61, p = 0.010, and marginally increased Response Bias,
b = 0.13, t = 1.68, p = 0.095, but not with Intentional Judgment,
b = 0.01, t = 0.06, p = 0.950. When adding Unintentional Judgment
toward negative primes, there was still a relationship for Uninten-
tional Judgment toward wrong primes, b = "0.20, t = "2.38,
p = 0.018, but not Unintentional Judgment toward negative primes,
b = 0.06, t = 0.76, p = 0.450. As expected, participants higher in psy-
chopathic tendencies showed reduced implicit moral evaluations
of moral transgressions.
Second, internalized moral identity was independently associ-
ated with increased Unintentional Judgment toward wrong primes,
b = 0.17, t = 2.47, p = 0.014, and increased Intentional Judgment,
b = 0.16, t = 2.03, p = 0.043, but not Response Bias, b = "0.00,
t = "0.05, p = 0.960. When adding Unintentional Judgment toward
negative primes, there were still significant relationships for Unin-
tentional Judgment toward wrong primes, b = 0.19, t = 2.24,
p = 0.026, and Intentional Judgment, b = 0.20, t = 2.32, p = 0.022,
but not Unintentional Judgment toward negative primes,
b = "0.06, t = "0.71, p = 0.476. On the other hand, symbolic moral
identity was only marginally positively associated with increased
Unintentional Judgment toward wrong primes, b = 0.13, t = 1.80,
p = 0.073, but not with Intentional Judgment, b = "0.03, t = "0.31,
p = 0.758, or Response Bias, b = "0.04, t = "0.48, p = 0.633. When
adding Unintentional Judgment toward negative primes, there
were no unique relationships (ps > 0.130). As expected, partici-
pants for whom morality was more intrinsically important to their
self-concepts showed stronger implicit moral evaluations of moral
transgressions. These individuals also showed increased Inten-
tional Judgment, which could be due to having moral information
more readily accessible to make target judgments accurately
(Aquino et al., 2009), or to being more generally experienced with
engaging in moral behaviors. These unique relationships of moral
identity with Unintentional Judgment and Intentional Judgment
indicate the advantage of the formal modeling approach, as this
method is one of the only attempts to measure these component
processes simultaneously.
Third, Guilt-Negative-Behavior Evaluation was marginally posi-
tively associated with increased Unintentional Judgment toward
wrong primes, b = 0.13, t = 1.88, p = 0.061, but not Intentional Judg-
ment, b = 0.07, t = 0.92, p = 0.358, or Response Bias, b = "0.06,
t = "0.72, p = 0.472. When adding Unintentional Judgment toward
negative primes, there was a positive relationship for Unintentional
Judgment towardwrong primes, b = 0.19, t = 2.16, p = 0.032, but not
Unintentional Judgment toward negative primes, b = "0.05,
t = "0.60, p = 0.553. For Guilt-Repair, there were not any significant
relationships with process parameters in the initial analysis
(ps > 0.480) or when also including Unintentional Judgment toward
negative primes (ps > 0.100). For Shame-Negative-Self-Evaluation,
there were not any significant relationships with process parame-
ters in the initial analysis (ps > 0.140) or when also including Unin-
tentional Judgment towardnegativeprimes (ps > 0.180). For Shame-
Withdraw, there was a marginal positive relationship for Response
Bias, b = 0.11, t = 1.68, p = 0.094, and when including Unintentional
Judgment toward negative primes, there were marginal positive
relationships for Unintentional Judgment toward wrong primes,
b = 0.12, t = 1.72, p = 0.088, and Response Bias, b = 0.12, t = 1.67,
p = 0.096. As expected, participants more prone to experience guilt
about acting unethically showed increased implicit moral evalua-
tions of moral transgressions.
Finally, there were no significant relationships between any
process parameters and sacred value judgments (ps > 0.080), with
only a marginal positive relationship for Unintentional Judgment
toward wrong primes, b = 0.15, t = 1.76, p = 0.081. There were no
relationships when including Unintentional Judgment toward neg-
ative primes (ps > 0.150). In contrast to the results for psychopathic
tendencies, moral identity, and guilt proneness, there was no evi-
dence for unique relationships with implicit moral evaluations of
moral transgressions.
Table 11
Correlations between parameter estimates and moral personality traits, Experiments 1–4.
Moral personality Intentional Unintentional wrong Unintentional negative Response bias
Self-reported psychopathy "0.11y "0.20** "0.08 0.05
Internalized moral identity 0.21** 0.24*** 0.12 "0.01
Symbolic moral identity 0.03 0.13* 0.08 0.02
GASP guilt-NBE 0.14* 0.17** 0.09 "0.05
GASP guilt-repair 0.07 0.10 "0.03 0.08
GASP shame-NSE 0.13y 0.17* 0.12y 0.05
GASP shame-withdraw 0.00 "0.01 "0.06 "0.08
Sacred value judgments 0.04 0.15y 0.11 0.02
Note. Guilt-NBE = Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation. Shame-NSE = Shame-Negative-Self-Evaluation. For all personality measures except Sacred Value Judgments, N = 235
for associations with Intentional, Unintentional Wrong, and Response Bias, and N = 196 for Unintentional Negative, which was not assessed in Experiment 1. For Sacred Value
Judgments, assessed in Experiments 1–3, N = 177 for associations with Intentional, Unintentional Wrong, and Response Bias, and N = 138 for Unintentional Negative.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.010, *p < 0.050, yp < 0.100.
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Across three measures of moral personality (psychopathic ten-
dencies, moral identity, guilt proneness, but not sacred value judg-
ments), participants who cared more about morality exhibited
stronger implicit moral evaluations about moral transgressions.
These results provide convergent support for the construct validity
of implicit moral evaluations.
8. General discussion
In everyday experience, the gap betweenmoral belief and moral
behavior can range from small to severe. Psychopaths may lurk
among us, but so do people who cheat on board games, taxes,
and lovers. Hypocrisy abounds in everyday life, as people can read-
ily say that they believe certain actions to be morally wrong, while
lacking the implicit moral evaluations that would prevent them
from engaging in such behaviors. To understand variability in
moral personality and moral behavior, it is useful to quantify
implicit moral evaluations using rigorous measurement techniques
that help disentangle underlying component processes.
Across five experiments, we developed the Moral Categoriza-
tion Task and multinomial model to understand component pro-
cesses involved in moral judgment. In the task, participants are
instructed to judge target actions as morally wrong or not, while
avoiding prime action words that were wrong or neutral. Consis-
tently across studies, transgression primes such as murder—com-
pared to neutral primes—biased moral judgments about neutral
targets such as baking, suggesting that the primes were moralizing
target actions.
A task dissociation approach would equate this performance
bias with the underlying process of interest (implicit moral evalu-
ations). By contrast, performance bias could be due to multiple
processes. Our multinomial model captures three processes: Inten-
tional Judgment (moral judgment of target actions), Unintentional
Judgment (an evaluative tendency to morally judge target actions
in a prime-consistent manner when Intentional Judgment fails),
and Response Bias (a directional tendency to judge target actions
as ‘‘wrong” when both Intentional Judgment and Unintentional
Judgment fail). The primary advantage of the multinomial model
is capturing these distinct component processes within the same
paradigm, rather than assuming that specific measures only cap-
ture specific processes.
The multinomial model quantifies distinct component pro-
cesses, but does not license the conclusion that Intentional and
Unintentional Judgment differ in terms of operating conditions
such as consciousness or efficiency. In the current experiments,
we used modeling to test theoretically derived predictions about
when processes would be more or less pronounced under different
experimental conditions. Across studies, Unintentional Judgment
was insensitive to fast response deadlines and unrelated to neuro-
physiological signals of control (the error-related negativity). By
contrast, Intentional Judgment was impaired by fast deadlines
and associated with error-related negativity. This dissociation by
relevant manipulations validates that these processes are indepen-
dent and specifies conditions under which they operate (Payne,
2008).
We stipulate that Intentional and Unintentional Judgment are
distinct on the basis of one feature: intentionality. This theory-
driven distinction is based upon what participants are instructed
to do: evaluate target actions while avoiding the influence of prime
actions. On the assumption that participants are following task
instructions, then their task intentions should be to morally judge
target actions; any moral judgment of prime actions should con-
flict with task intentions. Because Unintentional Judgment is pos-
ited to influence performance only when Intentional Judgment
fails, prime influence can be defined as unintentional. By formally
specifying the counter-intentional nature of implicit moral evalua-
tions, this work can advance the study of moral cognition by pro-
viding greater precision about one of its central constructs.
In our experiments, we validated that Unintentional Judgment
in response to moral transgressions on the Moral Categorization
Task is not simply a negative affective response. Unintentional
Judgment toward wrong primes was stronger than Unintentional
Judgment toward non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2–4).
Given that these primes are matched on affective dimensions of
valence and arousal but differ in moral content, this result suggests
that Unintentional Judgment toward wrong primes is attuned to
moral content in particular. Further supporting this claim, Unin-
tentional Judgment about transgressions uniquely associated with
moral personality. Importantly, we do not claim a firm distinction
between ‘‘the moral mind” and non-moral psychological processes.
Consistent with the emerging consensus in social neuroscience,
moral evaluations recruit a host of domain-general processes
including affect, conceptual knowledge, attention, and others
(Cameron et al., 2015; Cushman & Young, 2011; Decety & Cowell,
2014; Greene, 2015; Young & Dungan, 2012).
Finally, we validated the Unintentional Judgment on the Moral
Categorization Task can capture idiographic moral evaluations. In
Experiment 4, participants listed moral transgressions that they
were strongly opposed to, which were then incorporated as stim-
uli. Participant-generated moral transgressions produced similar
priming effects to researcher-generated moral transgressions.
Experiment 5 examined responses to a moral issue on which per-
sonal opinions vary: gay marriage. Implicit moral evaluations of
gay marriage as morally wrong were stronger for participants
who voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment against
gay marriage, establishing that the process parameters can align
with real-world behavior.
8.1. Modeling moral cognition
Formal models of moral cognition can increase theoretical pre-
cision in moral psychology by more clearly specifying which pro-
cesses shape moral judgment, under what conditions, and why
(Crockett, 2016). Multinomial modeling has many theoretical and
methodological advantages in understanding implicit moral evalu-
ations. A primary advantage is that instead of inferring underlying
processes from task performance, it stipulates a priori how distinct
processes interact as mediators between experimental inputs (e.g.,
prime stimuli, response deadline) and behavioral outputs (e.g.,
judgments on the Moral Categorization Task; cf. Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2015; Gawronski et al., 2014). Our multinomial
model parallels the ‘‘Control-dominating” process dissociation
model: the causal influence of Unintentional Judgment on task per-
formance is logically contingent on Intentional Judgment failing.
The multinomial model does not assume the existence of dual
systems, such as ‘‘System I” and ‘‘System II” (Kahneman, 2003).
Dual systems approaches have been critiqued because many of
the features meant to cluster within a given system—such as con-
sciousness, intentionality, and efficiency—do not reliably co-occur
(Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Inten-
tional Judgment and Unintentional Judgment reflect different pro-
cesses operating within the Moral Categorization Task, and
formally positing these processes does not require theoretical
assumptions of dual systems models. This approach does not
assume different processing modes, such that people alternate
between an ‘‘automatic mode” and a ‘‘controlled mode” (Greene,
2013). Rather, these component processes operate simultaneously
to influence moral judgment. Most importantly, multinomial mod-
eling avoids the task dissociation assumption that equates a given
task with a given process. Rather, performance on any task—rang-
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ing from sequential priming to self-report—is the net effect of
many interacting processes.
Finally, this approach is useful because it specifies a different
task domain than previous multinomial models of moral judgment
(e.g., Conway & Gawronski, 2013). Whereas prior work involves
moral decision-making in ambiguous situations with competing
principles in play, the current work focuses on immediate
responses to unambiguous stimuli. Our approach assumes that
moral judgments, regardless of the principles on which they are
based, can occur in response to target actions (Intentional Judg-
ment) or in response to prime actions (Unintentional Judgment).
In our view, a comprehensive approach to understanding variabil-
ity in moral cognition requires assessing moral evaluations using a
variety of measurement techniques which capture explicit moral
evaluations, implicit moral evaluations, and moral behavior.
9. Conclusion
Implicit moral evaluations—unintentional moral assessments of
the actions and characters of others—are central to many accounts
of moral cognition. Argued to be the psychological fulcrum of
moral competence, these evaluations need to be assessed rigor-
ously in a way that separates signal from noise. The current work
makes two advances toward this goal. First, we developed a new
implicit measure of moral judgment, that moves beyond self-
report to capture moral reactivity that is relatively unfiltered by
socially desirable response correction. Second, we developed a
multinomial model of task performance, dissociating variation in
implicit moral evaluations from co-activated processes such as
intentional moral evaluations and moralistic response biases. Our
approach advances theorizing in moral cognition by formally spec-
ifying implicit moral evaluations—as counter-intentional and com-
prised of affect and conceptual knowledge about morality—and
precisely quantifying who has them and who does not. By improv-
ing theoretical and methodological precision, we can better predict
moral behavior and understand the boundaries of moral
competence.
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